Comments on a curse

In her article ‘A curse with no cure?’ (The Broker 11), Bertine Kamphuis concludes that when looking for cures for the so-called resource curse, the following aspects are crucial to determining their likely success:

  • Avoid single-dimensional approaches to addressing the resource curse.
  • Counter the trend in which the responsibility for preventing the curse is mainly placed in the hands of governments and is portrayed as ‘simply’ a technical capacity problem.
  • Engage all agents involved in the resource extraction networks and follow a regional, if not a global, approach rather than a country approach.
  • Involve China in defining and resolving the problem.

Although I do not disagree with Kamphuis’ analysis, I do have three comments to make. The first relates to and confirms Kamphuis’ observation that economists have been particularly persistent in separating their cures from ‘messy’ politics, such as corruption, lack of democratization and instances of violent conflict. Very recent support for this claim can be found in the World Bank report, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads. This annual publication elaborates extensively on commodity dependence and growth, as well as on managing primary commodity booms. However, it hardly mentions such relevant subjects as governance, transparency and the role of China in Africa.

My second observation is that Kamphuis does not mention one author who to a very large extent succeeds in incorporating in his analysis and recommendations all four aspects mentioned above. Paul Collier does so in his 2007 book, The Bottom Billion1 . Admittedly, Collier only briefly discusses involving China in defining and resolving the problem. This brings me to my last comment. China’s role in the context of the resource curse is analyzed in greater detail by the Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) in its report Met het oog op China: op weg naar een volwassen relatie (China in the balance: towards a mature relationship)2 .

In this report the AIV refers to the future EU-China-Africa dialogue that was agreed on at the EU-China summit in September 2006. At this summit, the role of China and the EU in Africa in the context of global supply and demand of oil and other raw materials was an important agenda item. The AIV warns that not much should be expected from such a trilateral cooperation, because China considers itself as a developing rather than donor country. In addition, the rise of China has fundamentally altered African countries’ dependency – on the US and the EU – while strengthening China’s own position on the world stage. For this reason the AIV proposes a pragmatic businesslike approach where cooperation should for the time being focus not so much on programmes founded upon generally accepted principles as on specific projects that take account of the different countries’ wishes and needs.

The AIV takes the view that in the long term, as China’s vested interests – investments, exploitation of resources, logistic links, loans and so on – in that and similar parts of the world increase, it will have a growing interest in stability and security there.

Remarkably, as an observer interested in history will note, in this respect the AIV’s recommendations are very much in line with the policies of Lord Palmerston, arguably Britains’s most renowned Foreign Secretary, who held office for a total of 15 years during the second quarter of the 19th century. It was Palmerston’s view that a country such Britain then – and China now – had no permanent allies, only permanent interests.

Dr L.B.M. Mennes is emeritus professor of International Economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. He is the former managing director of the Netherlands Development-Finance Company (FMO).



Readers' Comments

The Broker, ìssue 12, column: Chocolate and child labour
In his column: “Chocolate and child labour” in the 12th issue of The Broker, Erwin Bulte addresses the relationship between child labour and international trade, awareness raising and other topics. Relationships can be positive and negative, so he sighs halfway: “But of course theorists can explain just about anything with clever models, so as always the evidence should rest on careful empirical analysis.” Rightfully so!
Going on about his chocoholics, he tries to outline the relationship between chocolate consumption and child labour in the African cocoa growing regions. Comparing the Vietnamese rice growing situation with African cocoa growing, he writes: “In contrast, much of African cocoa is grown on plantations, and the road from plantation to chocolate bar is firmly dominated by a handful of multinational firms.” Empirical evidence: ICCO reports, personal observations, indicate that more than 90% of all cocoa in Western Africa is grown by small holders. Farmers with a farm size of no more than 3 hectares. Hardly a plantation structure with non unionized workers!
Nevertheless it is true, the handful of big multinational firms dominate the international cocoa market. So in order to reduce the use of child labour in the African cocoa growing regions, we should strengthen the (income) position of the small farmers and take on the issue with the big multinational firms. And instead, trust our dentist on his dental knowledge but not on her/his assessment of the economics in the cocoa chain.

Dick de Graaf
retired trade union official
negociated with Dutch cocoa processing companies.
Two limitations to looking to the reformist countries
The recent World Bank report, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroad is an (almost) perfect example of economists separating their ‘cures’ from ‘messy’ politics. It deals with the narrow 'resource curse' of Sachs and Warner (with the ill-chosen proxy of NR exports and GDP for ‘abundance’). It treats different economic cures (fiscal restraints, saving and other funds) separate from governance and transparency, while the key argument being made is that, to quote Terry Lynn Karl of Stanford University, '... such prescriptions do not take into account a fundamental reality: what is often economically inefficient decision making is an integral part of the calculation of rulers to retain their political support by distributing petrodollars to their friends, allies, and social support bases’. In addition, no efforts are made to analyze the darker side of natural resources – the plunder, informal exports and criminal rackets that do not show up in economic statistics – and have shed a light on the informal, transnational networks through which armed groups, natural resources and international markets are related.

Although Paul Collier does deserve to be mentioned in a general piece on natural resources and violent conflict, The Bottom Billion to me shows the same (‘economist-like’) distinction between political and economic cures. The main argument of my article is that there are two limitations to looking to the reformist countries (those that are willing, but unable) as Collier does (he explicitly mentions that we should focus on the reformers and rather than focus on the 'difficult countries' unwilling):
1) The line between unwilling and unable is thin, and the way resource extraction is organized often provides the very incentives that pull an ‘unable’ government across this line. Many initially well-meaning reformers can become political crooks through the incentives and dynamics that are created with the resource rents pouring in.
2) The way China is trying to secure its energy and natural resource needs has led to accusations that it is allowing (or even pushing) countries to resist the transparency governance demands of the new global advocacy initiatives.